Abstract-Telecommunication networks based on commonplace technologies (such as Ethernet) often constitute a vulnerable attack vector against modern critical infrastructures (CIs), particularly for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which rely on them for monitoring and controlling physical components. This paper presents a unique platform that encompasses a range of capabilities, from cyber-attack detection to mitigation strategies, through interdependency and risk evaluation. The platform is made of two main components: a cyber-attack detection subsystem and a risk assessment framework. Both blocks are innovative from research point of view and they have been developed and customized to fit the CIs' features, that are completely different from telecommunication networks. This platform has been tested on a hybrid environment testbed, made of virtual and real components, within the scope of the EU FP7 CockpitCI and EU H2020 ATENA projects. The case study corresponds to a medium voltage power grid controlled by a SCADA control center, where the platform has been validated with optimal results in terms of detection capabilities and time response.
From Detecting Cyber-Attacks to Mitigating
Risk Within a Hybrid Environment
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE concept of critical infrastructure (CI) has been changing over the past years. This notion, which was mainly related to the public sector during the 1980s [1] , was redefined as a matter of national security [2] during the 1990s, and particularly after 9/11. This comes as no surprise, as CIs are the key assets, systems or networks of our lives; their partial destruction would have a negative effect on security, economy, and public health.
With time, the definition of CI has been extended to include other services. The concept of "lifeline system" was developed to evaluate large and geographically distributed networks, such as electric power, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste disposal, and water supply. Thinking about CIs through the subset of lifelines helps clarify common features on essential support systems and provides insights into the challenges to improve the performance of large networks.
CIs are often interdependent, due to physical proximity and service interaction [3] . For instance, this is the case with old pipelines and cables lying in the city underground, nearby other important facilities such as electric transformers. Another example of infrastructure interdependency is related to telecommunication networks, which play a crucial role to support the management and operation of several modern CIs, as it is the case for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The first generations of SCADA systems relied on isolation (the airgap principle), based on the use of proprietary and/or poorly documented technologies, to ensure security. However, as architectures evolved, these systems assimilated technologies from the information and communication technologies (ICT) world, such as TCP/IP and Ethernet networking, encouraging the interconnection of industrial control systems (ICS) with organizational ICT network infrastructures and even with the exterior (e.g., for remote maintenance) [4] . Once connected, SCADA ICS become increasingly vulnerable to a range of emerging threats, being targeted by a range of new actors as part of a cyber-warfare strategy. The well-publicized Stuxnet [5] , [6] worm is a prominent example of the latter case.
Nowadays, the number of known and unknown (zero-day) vulnerabilities is increasing, and therefore, also the number of cyber-attacks against lifeline systems [7] . Detecting such attacks is a basic step toward the proper management of physical infrastructures, but operators also need information about the effects of such incidents on physical systems. For the latter purpose, it is mandatory to create models that consider the existing interdependencies among several CIs, in order to assess the consequences of adverse events: this means that physical devices and delivered services must be considered together to produce a common result.
A. Contributions
This paper describes a unique framework for monitoring cyber-attacks, evaluating trustworthiness of detected attacks, assessing the effects on the physical systems and suggesting possible countermeasures to operators for mitigating risks. The main contribution is the integration of heterogeneous 1937-9234 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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capabilities in order to cope with cyber-attacks and interdependencies, in a near real-time manner. Each capability (there is a layer for detection and another for risk assessment) has been carefully designed to work within and in connection with CIs. Both the detection and the risk assessment layers are innovative from a research point of view and, in addition, they have been integrated in order to help operators in the decisionmaking process of evaluating the consequences of cyber-attacks on physical infrastructures. These innovations encompass several components, such as the shadow security unit (SSU) and CISIApro. The former is a detection probe specifically developed to be deployed at the edge of the SCADA ICS cyberphysical domain, while the latter constitutes the main element of the risk assessment layer, being able to handle real-time data coming from heterogeneous sources and assess the consequences of faults and cyber-attack on interdependent CIs.
The validation of this process was realized within a hybrid environment, designated as the hybrid environment for development and validation (HEDVa), made of virtual equipment and real physical devices, with the purpose of testing its performance in a real environment without the possibility of generating real damage.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on anomaly detection for cyber-attacks in SCADA networks and on interdependency and risk evaluation; in Section III, the cyber-attack detection platform is described, with Section IV presenting the interdependency model with risk assessment; the case study is detailed in Section V, in terms of validation environment and results; and, finally, conclusions and future works are discussed in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent successful cyber-attacks on SCADA networks demonstrate that CIs, such as power distribution grids, waste-water treatment units [8] , [9] or even nuclear fuel processing plants [10] are jeopardized by digital malicious agents. SCADA networks-and ICS in general-frequently constitute vulnerable targets due to their design philosophy and their technologies, primarily oriented toward reliability. In fact, the ICT and the ICS domains are significantly different in terms of their fundamental operational and functional properties, while the latter privileges availability and reliability over confidentiality and data integrity, the former is exactly the opposite [11] .
Consequently, cyber threat detection within ICS necessarily requires a domain-specific approach. Despite this conceptual difference, adopting solutions conceived for the ICT domain is frequently necessary, something that must be dealt in a suitable way, mainly for three reasons: 1) some components have to work uninterrupted, on a 24/7 basis [12] ; 2) every software release must be carefully tested by equipment manufacturers before being released; and 3) security mechanisms must impose a minimal overhead on the protected ICS. In face of this situation, several ICS managers ultimately adopted improper systems life-cycle management practices, disregarding regular updates or patching [13] , therefore increasing the probability of a successful attack. Also, the real-time nature of some SCADA systems discourages the use of conventional inline network security mechanisms such as firewalls with deep packet inspection capabilities or network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), as they constitute an unwanted point-of-failure that might also degrade latency.
There is a considerable amount of work regarding SCADA intrusion and anomaly detection, including intrusion detection systems (IDS) for embedded platforms, such as [14] , devicelevel anomaly detection [15] , [16] and classification [17] . However, not all solutions are equally feasible: for instance, devicelevel anomaly detection requires adding hardware mechanisms for probing. Moreover, dealing with attempts to cause loss of process visibility via man-in-the-middle (MITM) or processlevel attacks (though reprogramming or by inducing device behavior deviations) is out of scope for these mechanisms.
Recognizing the need to improve upon existing security solutions for SCADA ICS, the proposed framework was set up with the objective of addressing both the problems of CI interdependency and security, in an integrated fashion, building upon the past experience of the MICIE [18] and CockpitCI [19] projects. The development and implementation of a Cyber-Security detection framework for SCADA ICS will be described and analyzed with details in Section III. This detection framework improves upon the state-of-the-art, by adding diversified and specific analysis mechanisms and detection probes. Among its innovative features, which will be next described into more detail, one of the most relevant has to do with the awareness about the physical processes behind the SCADA ICS, that must be considered as an important feature of the overall system. However, detecting cyber-attacks is not enough if we want to improve operators' situation awareness and their time response. The assessment of consequences is a fundamental step for providing meaningful information to CI operators.
Consequence assessment on heterogeneous infrastructures is a complex task usually related with CI simulators and with interdependency modeling techniques. In [20] , the authors survey the principal methods for modeling and simulation of CIs. Their report reveals that most of the approaches for dealing with infrastructure interdependencies, cascading system failures, and risk mitigation are complementary, rather than competing.
The majority of simulators employ the agent-based paradigm, in which a population of autonomous interacting agents coordinate their decisions to reach a higher-level global objective. [21] Each infrastructure is modeled as an agent, with interdependencies being modeled as edges between agents. This enables agents to exchange information: each agent receives inputs from other agents and sends the outputs to other agents (see Nieuwenhuijs et al. [22] for further details). In this paper, Critical Infrastructure Simulation by Interdependent Agents (CISIApro) simulator [23] employs the agent-based paradigm, where each agent has a high-level description of the internal dynamics of an infrastructure. The main goal of CISIApro is to study the propagation of faults/attacks and the resulting performance degradation [24] . CISIApro exploits a specific metrics similar to a risk assessment one: the operational level. In [25] , the authors survey the most used approach for risk assessment. CISIApro architecture will be described and analyzed in details in Section IV.
This article also analyses how increasing situation awareness improves the response capabilities and the decision process. As demonstrated in [26] , including data on the propagation of an adverse event and their consequences on equipment and services improves the resilience and the response time of the considered infrastructures through suitable mitigation algorithms. The output of CISIApro can be included in an optimization algorithm for improving the decision process considering the events that are not within the infrastructure. The proposed architecture in this article is based on the previous works of data fusion frameworks [27] .
III. DEVELOPING CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION CAPABILITIES
One of the principal goals of the architecture consisted of implementing capable cyber detection capabilities for SCADA ICS. Such mechanisms constitute a dynamic perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS) [28] , which is responsible for the continuous CI security auditing and monitoring.
The PIDS architecture (see Fig. 1 ) is organized along the three different zones of the CI, each one with its own security scope: the Control Network, SCADA Process Control Network, and the IT Network. Components and security policies are customized to suit the characteristics and requirements of each network domain, whose perimeter is monitored by a NIDS, configured according to its network traffic profile.
PIDS detection agents are deployed within each CI domain, feeding the information stream from which the security status of the CI is inferred. These agents provide diversified detection capabilities, encompassing customized third party modules, as well as security components especially developed for this project. The latter include network probes (such as NIDS), IT [29] and SCADA [30] honeypots, host-level agents (such as Host IDS-HIDS) and device monitoring components (like the SSU), among others.
The information fed by the detection agents is processed by a hierarchically distributed multi-zone correlation architecture [28] . The initial processing stage is provided by the local zone correlators, which also perform event reduction, filtering and aggregation. By their turn, local correlators feed a main correlator that has a global view on the CI security status. This approach provides context separation and allows for improved efficiency and scalability for event processing. In this way, the main correlator can focus on inter-scope event correlation and root cause analysis, as well as alert prioritization.
Correlation is complemented by machine-learning capabilities, in the form of one-class support vector machine (OCSVM) [31] anomaly detection modules [28] . The OCSVM analysis components, which were especially developed for the PIDS [32] are fed with real-time network traces, being deployed in the three network zones -for this reason, each module requires different training sets. Such modules are capable of detecting potentially relevant security events (abnormal or deviant behaviors), which are sent to the main correlator.
The segmented architecture of the PIDS encourages the selection and deployment of the security agents which better suit the specific characteristics of each CI domain, also allowing to fine-tune the configurations for agents, local correlators and OCSVM modules accordingly with their context. Moreover, analysis components are fed with zone-specific topology information provided by the network and asset management systems.
The operation of the PIDS is coordinated through a security management platform (SMP) which has a dual role: it provides the mechanisms for managing the PIDS components (via an out-of-band interface or secure channel) as well as the monitoring of in-place security and vulnerabilities within the network. The SMP is also responsible to feed other architecture components (i.e., CISIApro for risk assessment) by retrieving relevant information from the detection layer.
The event messages which flow between the PIDS components are encoded using the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF -RFC4765) [33] , a platformneutral and extensible format. Event passing is supported using advanced message queuing protocol (AMQP) [34] message queues, providing secure and reliable transport, while offering high-availability capabilities.
A. Innovative Detection Agents
The PIDS encompasses several kinds of detection agents, including existing components (such as the Snort NIDS [35] or the OSSEC HIDS [36] , which are customized and integrated using coupling adaptors) as well as components specifically developed for this architecture, like the SCADA Honeypot [30] , [37] , the SSU [38] , host output traffic control, or the exec, vulnerability and behavior checker agents [28] . Among these agents, the first two constitute innovative concepts for domain-specific components that will be next discussed in more detail, from a research point of view.
1) SCADA Honeypot: The SCADA honeypot [30] , [37] is a security agent designed to operate in the control network of a SCADA ICS system, binding to the unused IP addresses, coexisting with devices that populate this scope [such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), RTUs, and sen- sors/actuators]. It emulates the operation and service footprint of a commercial Modbus PLC, luring attackers, and reporting any interaction. It is a cost-effective proposal, being designed to run on a single board computer or within a virtual machine (VM).
The SCADA honeypot is based on a hybrid architecture (see Fig. 2 ), in the sense that it runs both simulated and complete implementations of services commonly available on PLC devices. Its components include a fully functional Modbus TCP emulator, providing an entire device instance, including variables (registers) and functions, enabling an attacker to interact with it. The front-end services module also includes HTTP WebUI (web management interface), file transfer protocol and simple network management protocol components, corresponding to services commonly found in various Modbus PLCs. These are further complemented by a Portscan service module, capable of capturing network interactions to detect anomalous activity, by listening to the TCP/IP ports not in use by other service modules.
Other components include a Processing and correlation module, which parses and processes alerts from the front-end services, also performing filtering and event aggregation. Security events are IDMEF-encoded and published on a local correlator queue by the eventing and reporting module. Finally, an agent management module provides management services via an outof-band interface, working together with a watchdog component to improve platform resilience.
2) Shadow Security Unit: As a result of several vulnerabilities, ranging from firmware bugs to communications protocol weaknesses, various PLC and RTU devices are known to be exposed to attacks such as flooding, protocol tampering or buffer overflow exploits. While different approaches have been proposed to deal with this situation, by using encrypted communications or mutual authentication mechanisms, their deployment is often unfeasible, due to latency overhead issues [12] , reliability concerns or the need for modification of established protocols and architectures.
This situation has prompted the development of a security solution for PLC/RTU devices, capable of providing ongoing monitoring capabilities with minimal overhead: the SSU [38] (see Fig. 3 ). Working in parallel with RTUs/PLCs and requiring few modifications on existing setups, the SSU is able to transparently monitor both the SCADA command flow and the state of the physical process interfaces. It should be noticed that the SSU is deployed out of the critical control path, and minimizes any potential impact on the monitored device (for instance, due to a malfunction). The fundamental SSU operation principle follows a two-stage model comprising a training and a detection phase. The training phase is started once the SSU is first deployed, with the purpose of establishing the SCADA protocol and I/O models for the normal PLC/RTU operation state. Afterward, the SSU will go into a detection mode, using the models built during training to perform runtime analysis of acquired data.
The SSU embeds several techniques allowing it to detect threats such as layer 2 network attacks, protocol tampering or process disruption attempts-moreover, it can also provide information on the operational/health status of the monitored device. The SSU is also able to replicate copies of communication control flows, for consumption by an optional message checker system (see Fig. 3 ). This system creates a closed loop between the SCADA human-machine interface (HMI) and the PLCs, for transaction integrity validation and tampering checks, at the communication endpoints. Fig. 3 depicts the operation of the SSU prototype, designed for Modbus/TCP PLCs. The communications stream analysis stage captures and processes the PLC network interactions, acquired via an integrated Ethernet TAP, which is placed between the monitored device and the upstream communications link. Modbus protocol interactions are modeled using first-order discrete time Markov chains (DTMC) to create probabilistic automata models (built during training), used for behavior analysis. This stage also performs network flow anomaly detection, via timeseries analysis.
The physical I/O probing stage assesses the state of the physical inputs and outputs of the PLC. It works together with a data acquisition hardware component consisting of several differential voltage probes (one for each I/O channel) coupled to an eight channel, 10-bit analog to digital converter. A software module processes and timestamps the captured data, for time series (on analog I/O) and DTMC analysis (for discrete I/O).
The outputs of the communications and I/O probing stages are fed to a local processing and correlation stage. Its role is manifold, allowing to relate anomalous SCADA protocol interactions (such as low-probability opcode sequences) with physical I/O behavior deviations, within a time window, or to validate authorized device source addresses (using access control listsACLs).
Finally, eventing, management, and watchdog components (not depicted in the figure) are similar to the ones from the Modbus Honeypot architecture.
B. PIDS Detection Capabilities
By encompassing both a diverse number of heterogeneous probes and analysis techniques, the design of the cyber-detection layer was conceived in order to provide comprehensive detection capabilities. Such capabilities provide the means to cope with several attack scenarios mentioned as follows.
1) Layer 2/3 Communications Network Attacks:
These include protocol-level scanning/scouting attempts, attack on packet/frame integrity or denial-of-service attacks. Such scenarios are covered by an array of network probes such as the signature-based and anomaly detection NIDS, as well as analytic techniques supported by information provided by agents for counter and event extraction from the network management layer. Scanning attempts can also be detected with the help of honeypot probes, which play an important role in providing profiling information about the attacker strategy and skill level.
2) SCADA Protocol/Service-Level Attacks: This class encompasses MITM-based scouting attempts, function code scan attacks, abuse of protocol specifications, or vulnerability exploitation. These are covered by an array of network probes such as the signature-based NIDS and also the SSU. Honeypot probes are also effective to detect scouting attempts for this attack category.
3) Process Level/Semantic Attacks: This category includes advanced MITM scenarios with process-specific manipulation, direct process manipulation, interception/fuzzing or device reprograming. The SSU was designed specifically to deal with these scenarios, being deployed in the cyber-physical edge of the infrastructure to gather information about the network-side interactions and physical I/O state changes.
4) Host and Server-Level Attacks:
These threats are monitored by HIDS probes, as well as other components such as the software checker or behavior checker. These provide OSlevel behavior and configuration change detection, including out-of-band binary analysis capabilities which allow the PIDS to monitor with the host-level context of the infrastructure.
This list is not exhaustive, being organized by categories in order to provide a high-level overview of the PIDS detection capabilities regarding each type of threat. More details about how the PIDS operates in the presence of specific attacks are available in [28] .
IV. MITIGATING RISK USING INTERDEPENDENCY MODELING
CI operators need additional information on the consequences of cyber-attacks on devices and on service performances, to properly react to malicious events. The first important step is the detection of a cyber-attack and later on, the mitigation of its consequences on the system. Notice that the interdependencies are evident during the domino effects, but they can be also exploited during reaction and mitigation strategies. To this aim, the following section describes an agent-based interdependency simulator called CISIApro [23] , developed for research purposes and validated in several European projects ( [18] , [39] ) for understanding the cascading effects of faults and/or threats, such as cyber-attacks, in ICS and in CIs. Due to the fact that the evolution of the system states is usually governed by complex dynamics (often nonlinear), CISIApro simulator must consider the underlined mathematical model during the interdependency analysis. In this section, we introduce the mathematical concepts implemented in CISIApro to consider infrastructures interactions and interdependencies. Thanks to graph theory and to Multilayer networks modeling, our agent-based simulator is able to capture the system behavior both in anomaly situation (such as single fault, natural disaster or cyber-attack) and in normal state where each component is able to produce and delivery outputs following the system model.
A. Multilayer Networks
We can formally define a graph (i.e., a single-layer network) as a tuple G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E = V × V is the set of edges that connects pairs of nodes. Two nodes are called adjacent, if there exists an edge between them.
In order to model CI dynamics, we need to enrich the graph description of the system, considering the structure represented by the layers of the network, in addition to classical nodes and edges entities. Using the formalism of the multilayer networks [40] , a complex system with d different types of layers is usually indicated as
, where other variables can be used to indicate whether a node is present in the considered layer.
We first construct a set We can now introduce the edge set E M ⊆ V M × V M , defined as the set of all possible combinations of node-layers. It should be noticed that different connection can be considered through this set, such as self-node connection in different layers as well as multiple layer linking.
Finally, we can define a multilayer network as a quadruplet
Notice that a single-layer network is a special case of a multilayer network, where d = 0 and V M = V becomes redundant. In addition, given a subset D ⊆ L of the layers of the multilayer network M , a special set of nodes that can be reached by any edge starting from a generic node v from any of the layers in D, is called neighborhood and is formally defined as Γ(v, D) .
In what follows, the CISIApro multilayer network structure is discussed and the interdependency risk evaluation modeling is introduced.
B. CISIApro Structure
CISIApro is an agent-based simulator, where complex behaviors are modeled through the interaction of simple agents. Each agent has the same structure and is able to interact with the environment and with other agents.
In general, the first two elements in a multilayer network M yield a graph G M (V M , E M ), so we can interpret a multilayer network as a graph whose nodes and edges are labeled in a certain way. We can easily say that a multilayer network M is directed if all the underlying graph G M are directed. Mathematically, the E M is an ordered set of edges, and therefore
CISIApro structure is a directed multilayer network where each agent is a node, which appears in at least one layer but can also be included in all the layers. CISIApro also employs the usual convention of disallowing self-edges in the multilayer network by preventing self-edges in the underlying graph, i.e., ((u, α), (u, α)) / ∈ E M . CISIApro structure associates each agent with the set of nodes represented by the same entity in different layers. Therefore, within the CISIApro structure, the coupling edges, denoted by E C = { ((u, α), (v, β) ) ∈ E M |u = v, ∀u, v ∈ E M , ∀α, β ∈ L}, are always present.
CISIApro structure defines a layer through a propagation or diffusion model among the nodes in the considered layer. A possible representation of a multilayer graph is depicted in Fig. 4 . The multilayer network is composed of three layers, where the black dotted lines are the coupling edges, the red dotted lines are interlayer edges E inter = { ((u, α), (v, β) ) ∈ E M |u = v, α = β} and the other lines are the intralayer edges E intra = { ((u, α), (v, β) ) ∈ E M |u = v, α = β}.
C. Discrete Dynamic Model
Each node (u, α) that appears in at least one layer of M has associated a status vector x u (t), which describes the evolution of the u component at time t. The status vector of each component is modeled as being governed by a nonlinear discrete dynamical equation, where the status update for each component u is modulated using its internal state x i (t) and the data received from the neighbors.
Formally, the discrete-time nonlinear dynamics of the status vectors at time k are specified as follows:
where g u and h u are nonlinear functions, z u (t) represents the external input for the node u, and y Γ + (u,L) (t) are the received data from the incoming neighborhood. The incoming neighborhood of the node u is defined as 
(t) . . . z u (t)]
T , ∀u ∈ V. Hence, the resulting dynamical system can be rewritten as
where g and h represent the column vectors of g u , ∀u ∈ V and h u , ∀u ∈ V, respectively. As pointed out in [40] , the dynamical model defined in (3) is general enough to include all the classical approaches already defined in multilayer networks literature, such as percolation cascades or susceptible-infected-recovered models. In this context, agent-based algorithms or interdependency modeling, can then be used to represents complex interactions such as the effects of an MITM attack in the CI world.
D. CISIApro Implementation Details
As already pointed out in the previous sections, CISIApro is an agent-based simulator, where each agent has the same structure. In particular, each agent receives resources and failures from the upstream agents and spreads it to the downstream ones, following the dynamic model defined in (3).
The layers are obtained from the propagation of a resource or a fault. A resource is a service or a data produced and/or consumed by the agent, represented in CISIApro as an entity. The entity produces or receives also failures (in general, malfunctions) representing a physical failure or a possible cyber-attack. The malfunctions are spread among the agents following different propagation models that take into account the class of the interdependencies (i.e., layers) and the reliability of the information. The considered layers are physical, logical, geographical, and cyber.
The ability to produce resources is summarized by the concept of operational level, depending on the availability of received resources, on the propagation of faults, and on the functionality of the entity itself.
The operational level of each agent can be considered as a risk metric. Usually risk is a numeric value, from the impact severity, the likelihood of occurrence or threat, and the vulnerability analysis. In CISIApro applications, the likelihood of occurrence is usually considered more connected to the concept of trustworthiness of the information. For each entity, the user can add also a vulnerability variable, but in the following case study, we suppose that the vulnerability depends only on the distance from the source and on the persistence of the attack itself. The operational level of each agent is associated to a risk level: the risk is the amount of harm due to specific events, such as a cyber-attack, and can be evaluated as
where 1 is the maximum value of the operational level. A higher value of operational level means a lower risk. Therefore, the operational level represents a dynamic risk assessment considering the cascading effects of adverse events, i.e., natural disasters, failures or cyber-attacks. This value is normalized for each infrastructure considering the quality of service toward customers and other infrastructures. For a complete analysis of the implementation of CISIApro structure, we refer the reader to [41] .
E. Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) Approach
The main approach used in CISIApro to model the interactions among infrastructures, considering all the underlying interdependencies, is the MHR modeling technique [42] .
This approach allows us to choose the right level between decomposition and abstraction of a complex system-of-systems to obtain meaningful information.
The MHR approach, proposed by [42] , was created to exploit the advantages of holistic and reductionist methods. On one hand, in holistic modeling, infrastructures are seen as singular entities with defined boundaries and functional properties, while, on the other hand, reductionist modeling emphasizes the need to fully understand the roles and behavior of individual components to truly understand the infrastructure as a whole. Different levels of analysis require one or both of the two points of view and their boundaries are lost in event of complex scenarios. With the MHR model, relationships among infrastructures could be seen at different levels through either a top-down or a bottom-up approach. A key element of operators is the quality of services toward customers. This analysis strengthens the addition of another layer, called service, describing functional relationships among components and infrastructures at different levels of granularity. In MHR, services to customers and to other interconnected infrastructures are explicitly considered as a middle layer between holistic and reductionist agents.
Notice that CISIApro is the upgraded version of CISIA simulator, where the agent-based modeling has been maintained, but different functionalities related to the design phase has been added. In CISIApro, a graphical user interface (GUI) is provided to quickly create entities and connect them easily (see [41] ), considering the exchanged resources among agents.
The main advantage of this simulator is the great flexibility of the modeling approach: CISIApro is able to consider several interdependent infrastructures, electrical grid, gas networks, water distribution, telecommunications, and rail road systems, as in [26] and [43] . The operational mode can be both centralized and distributed. In the latter case, a CISIApro simulator must be located in each control center and subsequently synchronized using aggregated data, such as the operational level of services.
Input data of CISIApro are usually provided by the SCADA control center, and describe the state of the physical plant or, thanks to the PIDS (see Section III), the effects of the cyberattacks on the overall system.
The output of CISIApro can be used to help operators in the decision-making process: the results show how faults, cyberattacks, and natural disasters affect the modeled infrastructures in terms of equipment and performances. In addition, thanks to specific software adapters, the output of CISIApro can be exposed as a service to feed other processes, such as decision support systems (DSSs) or other risk-assessment tools. For an example of this architecture, please refer to [26] and [43] .
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
This section describes the validation scenario instantiated within the HEDVa testbed. This scenario is used to demonstrate how CISIApro is able to collect information from the SCADA control systems and the CI PIDS to evaluate risk on the single component and on the main service of the case study, suggesting better reaction strategies to operators. For this purpose, a MITM cyber-attack was implemented on the HEDVa, also providing the means to showcase PIDS detection capabilities.
A. Hybrid Environment for Development and Validation
The HEDVa (see Fig. 5 ) was designed by the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) for development and validation of ICS, Internet of Things, and data security research projects, constituting a distributed environment with multitenant capabilities that allows the simultaneous coexistence of different lab environments. It provides the ability to emulate operation scenarios based on real SCADA and network management systems, encompassing both process emulation and integration of physical components (hence, its hybrid nature).
Available HEDVa resources include several categories, such as VMs, virtual or physical network routers and switches, virtualized networks (accommodating different topologies for each environment), storage, PLCs or RTUs, SCADA HMI applications, CI emulators, life-cycle management components, and tools for requirement and validation management. All these resources are aggregated into a "Development Pool," providing the building blocks for the implementation of CI labs within the HEDVa.
Each lab tenant, which is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of a specific environment, is able to allocate the resources needed to create its own use case scenario. For instance, the creation of a simple SCADA lab can be undertaken in three steps: planning and definition of the lab characteristics, including network topologies, physical asset list (such as PLCs), and required VMs (such as HMIs, master stations or historian DBs, also including the instances needed to support experimental measurements); provisioning of physical/virtual assets and network topology overlays; and the implementation of the use case model within the lab environment instance.
In the scope of this framework, the HEDVa hosts the smart validation environment, an evolution of the scenario that was originally devised for the MICIE project. This concept integrates user requirements, use case modeling, advanced emulation of CIs, and availability of historical data within a validation scenario that was instantiated on the HEDVa, using a mix of physical devices (such as PLCs), VMs (hosting HMIs or historian DB hosts), and network topologies. It provides the means to support the development and validation of mechanisms and models for cyber-attack detection and mitigation.
B. Case Study
As a case study, two interconnected infrastructures are here considered: a medium voltage power grid and the SCADA telecommunication network. The power grid is made of two lines fed by two substations to transform current from high voltage grid to medium voltage network, see Fig. 6 . The two lines are usually disconnected, thanks to two circuit breakers (i.e., 7 and 8) that are normally open. The lines are radials, but their topology can change opening or closing several circuit breakers. The circuit breakers, except the two inside the substations, are telecontrolled from the SCADA control center by means of the telecommunication network, Fig. 7 . Each telecontrolled circuit breaker has an associated PLC which is able to transmit data to the control center about actual state and alarms, and receive data from the control center about opening or closing circuit breakers.
In case of a permanent failure on the power grid, the operator executes a fault isolation and system restoration (FISR) procedure, opening and closing the circuit breakers. This procedure, first, detects where the fault happened and, second, restores the current to customers as soon as the damage is repaired. If a cyber fault happens in the SCADA telecommunication network, the FISR procedure fails with unpredictable consequences.
C. MITM With ARP Poisoning as Example of Cyber-Attack
An MITM [44] , [45] attack corresponds to a situation where a third-party becomes involved in the middle of the communication stream, while remaining unnoticed. For instance, an attacker may fool an HMI by directly interacting with it and providing normal process data (obtained from a network traffic capture and later used for a reply attack) while attacking the PLC in the background. MITM attacks can be implemented using several techniques, ranging from ARP poisoning [46] to routing redirection [47] ; Fig. 8 illustrates the first scenario.
In the first stage of the ARP poisoning MITM, the attacker generates a series of unrequested ARP replies for both the HMI and the PLC (top half in Fig. 8 ), poisoning the local ARP caches in such a way that the MAC address of the attacker system becomes associated with the IP of the HMI for the PLC and the IP of the PLC for the HMI, respectively. Further interaction attempts from the HMI to the PLC will be redirected to the attacker system, and vice versa. In a second attack stage, connections are intercepted in real time using a packet manipulation tool (such as SCAPY [48] ) to perform session hijacking on the TCP connection. Afterward, the attacker may provide a fake device for the HMI to interact with, using a Modbus simulator programmed with information obtained from a previous survey or by replaying previously recorded protocol interactions, corresponding to a normal operation scenario. 
1) Implementing an MITM on the HEDVa Testbed:
The use case that was implemented on the HEDVa consists of a hybrid energy grid testbed, in the sense that real PLCs emulate breakers and substations, with a simulator calculating the voltage and current values for segments, accordingly with a mathematical model of the physical grid behavior. This approach combines the best of two worlds: the safety of using a simulated model, together with the benefits of using physical equipment to emulate control functions (hence the "hybrid" designation). The simulation model is also able to react accordingly with established operator reconfiguration FISR procedures. Fig. 9 depicts the simplified logical network structure deployed on the HEDVa.
The testbed includes two HMI systems that interact with a set of PLCs-one for simulated grid supervision and control, providing a detailed view about the status of the breakers and substation feeders (the main HMI), and another one that mirrors basic functionality of the latter, for attack monitoring purposes. From a network point of view, each HMI continuously polls each PLC via Modbus/TCP. The network path between the control network (where the PLCs are) and the process control network (where the HMIs are) also includes several switches and a router/security gateway. The testbed was also equipped with a full PIDS deployment (not shown in the figure), including SSU units paired with the PLCs.
For validation purposes, an ARP MITM attack was prepared and executed on the HEDVa, with the purpose of fooling the main HMI and make it loose process visibility, making the attack go unnoticed. The attacker, which had access to the control network, intercepts and hijacks HMI-PLC communications, reproducing the normal operation of the simulated grid. Afterward, normal state data were fed back to the main HMI while directly manipulating PLCs, without any visible supervisory feedback on the main HMI. The attack was accomplished and tested with the PIDS disabled, in order to establish the vulnerability level of the HEDVa testbed.
The first step, consisting of the redirection of the normal traffic from the main HMI, was accomplished by sending ARP spoofed messages to impersonate the IP-MAC address associations. The attacker sent unicast unsolicited ARP-Reply messages to the PLCs and the router interface on the control network (the HMIs are on a different LAN segment), informing that the HMI and PLC IPs are respectively associated with the attacker MAC address. In order to keep the ARP cache of the end points spoofed, this needed to be done continuously during all the traffic interception. This enables the Modbus stream to be redirected through the attacker, where all traces are recorded. Despite the fact that the information stream was not modified or manipulated, this step provided the means for the attacker to eavesdrop all the communications and scout for information about the controlled processes.
In the second part of the attack, the intruder blocked all the requests from the main HMI to the PLCs while redirecting the HMI interaction to a scripted pseudo-simulator crafted with SCAPY, operating inline and in real time. In order to create a successful attack, the attacker had to properly handle all the TCP operations, including connection establishment and termination, not forgetting acknowledgment and keep-alive related messages. For this purpose, it had to calculate and craft TCP header fields like the sequence and acknowledgment numbers. In addition, the attacker also needed to handle Modbus read and write operations, forging the replies using the same transaction field number from the requests and using the SCADA register values corresponding to a normal state.
Since the grid state is the result of the coordinated operation of all PLCs, the attacker scripts are able to respond to HMI operations and react accordingly, by simulating the correct reaction from the PLCs-as such, when the HMI user operates a specific breaker (managed by a PLC), the entire view is updated accordingly, including the energy values of affected segments. This is a delicate procedure, requiring all steps to be performed on real time, because otherwise the operator or even the system itself may trigger an alarm if a loss of a TCP connection, a malformed Modbus packet or even an inconsistent behavior in the SCADA scenario are detected.
2) ARP MITM Detection by the PIDS:
The HEDVa hosts a complete deployment of the PIDS, which was activated once the execution of the use case attacks on the existing infrastructure was proven to be feasible. During platform validation, several PIDS components demonstrated their effectiveness for ARP MITM attack detection.
1) The Perimeter NIDS, which detects network traffic involving a station that is not part of the topology extracted from asset management systems, together with fake ARP replies from an unknown host, following an unusual teletraffic pattern (interarrival rates are too small for normal operation thresholds). Such events are reported to the local correlator for the network domain. 2) The OCSVM on the control network that detects an abnormal traffic pattern (ARP packets with rate above the learned alarm threshold), generating an event to the local correlator for the network domain.
3) The SSU units, due to several capabilities: ACLs are configured with the IP/MAC addresses of the systems that are authorized to interact with the monitored PLCs; the SSU network traffic analysis modules are able to detect unusual patterns (an excessive ARP reply packet rate); the highlevel command flow processing capabilities are able to detect unusual command patterns that do not correspond to the normal operation sequences; finally, the message checker, which was deployed on the HEDVa, are able to detect inconsistencies between the main HMI interactions and Modbus commands arriving at the PLCs.
Once the evidence gathered by the network domain local correlators reaches the global correlator, a chained rule match is triggered, generating an alarm that is sent to the integrated risk predictor, namely, CISIApro.
Complementary to the PIDS, good security policies can also be extremely effective against ARP poisoning attacks, such as the use of static ARP lists or managed switches featuring port security or dynamic ARP inspection mechanisms (which a large number of SCADA operators do not use, nevertheless). Moreover, even if such measures are deployed, the PIDS remains effective against other types of MITM attacks, such as spanning tree protocol [49] or routing redirection attacks.
D. CISIApro Results
In order to properly demonstrate the ability of CISIApro, we depicted the results of the experiment, which lasted 40 s in a real scenario validation and is divided into two parts. The first part, lasting from 1 to 10 s, involves the attacker performing an MITM attack on the SCADA network (see Fig. 7 ), as described in previous sections. The second part, lasting from 11 to 40 s, involves an infection being spread from the attacker in the aftermath of the MITM attack. The malware reaches a subset of four PLCs in the HEDva (see Fig. 5 ), numbered 3, 4, 6, and 9, in Fig. 7 . Those PLCs are physically linked to one electric switch with the same numbering, see Fig. 6 . During the malware spreading, the ability to properly telecontrol power switches is downgraded and cannot be guaranteed.
For the MITM attack, the spreading rule is related to the distance of the infected node: the greater is the number of hops needed for reaching the node, the lower are the effects of the cyber-attack and the risk of node malfunction. In our simulation, the operational level of the attacked node (SCADA nodes no. 6 (in Fig. 7) is 0.9, and it is the same for the set of PLCs connected to node no. 6.
For the malware spreading, the propagation is still related to the distance, but each node has an increasing exponential trend for the effect of the malware. The exponential function and its parameters have been obtained starting from literature reviews, expert interviews, historical data (if existing), and from some simulations, and then extracting the best fitting pattern from all available information.
When the malware is detected at 11 s, the SCADA telecommunication node is highly affected and the information has a high trustworthiness, see Fig. 10 .
The trends of the entities are related to the distance and therefore the node needs more time to become completely unavailable. The set of PLCs (number 3, 4, 6, and 9 in Fig. 7 ) linked to the SCADA node no. 6 has a similar trend of the up-stream node with a delay of one time step, see Fig. 11 .
The main aim of the CISIApro simulator is to help the decision making of the operator. The reconfiguration procedure of an electrical grid is a very easy and common task for the operator, but requires interconnected infrastructures. Supposing a fault in the power grid, depicted in Fig. 6 as a yellow explosion, two alternative configuration are considered: FISR no. 1 (opening breakers no. 4 and no. 6; breakers no. 7 and no. 5 are already open; the only disconnected customer is number 4; load number 3 is fed from the substation no. 2) and FISR no. 2 (opening breakers no. 4 and no. 6; customers no. 4 and no. 3 are isolated).
The two reconfiguration procedures are affected differently due to infection spreading: the first FISR is less risky than the second one because it involves PLCs that are not affected by the malware. Therefore, the platform is able to suggest the less-risky reconfiguration option, in order to improve electrical operator readiness in case of cyber-attacks, where quick response time is mandatory.
In more complex scenarios, where several configurations are possible, the network reconfiguration algorithm can be implemented for finding all the possible configurations. Then, they are ranked using a multicriteria decision-making algorithm that mimics the operator behavior. The multicriteria decisionmaking algorithm [43] , [50] is a heuristic for multiobjective optimization problems that rank different alternatives (i.e., configurations) based on several criteria. One of the reasons why we choose this method is related to the ability to change ranking based on different priority of the operator, by means of changing the criteria weights.
E. Effectiveness of the Proposed Platform
The cyber detection platform has been designed in order to recognize several heterogeneous possible threats within the SCADA ICS. The list of detectable attacks contains among the others: MITM, denial-of-service, worms, trojans, device impersonation, and nonauthorized tempering. The architecture can be deployed in different contexts with different possible configurations that are due to specific constraints of the SCADA ICS infrastructure. The configuration of the cyber detection capability is usually defined by the installed probes on network.
The results coming from CISIApro are presented to the operator using a GUI. Thanks to the interactions between the cyber detection layer and the mitigation one, we tested different scenarios provided by the stakeholders (IEC corporation): best and worst cases in terms of response time for services to customer restoration have been evaluated, and the overall performances increased around 50% respect to classical approaches.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The main contribution of this paper consists of a unique framework which helps in increasing the CI operator readiness in critical situations. In order to describe its operation, a complete functional information flow description is provided, from detecting a cyber-attack up to evaluating consequences on equipment, in order to suggest a different reconfiguration strategy. The IDMEF events are exchanged in order to transmit updated messages on the actual state of the physical system (from SCADA control centers) and of the cyber-attacks (from the detection platform). All the messages are collected by CISIApro, and the interdependency model is able to provide the propagation on physical device and on services. For evaluation and validation purposes, the authors considered a reconfiguration service realized by electrical operators, for which the proposed framework was able to suggest the minimum risk decision.
Ongoing developments include a continuous update of all the described platforms. 1) Complementing the detection platform with active reaction capabilities allowing to change the configuration of the telecommunication network in real time, by taking advantage of the software-defined network paradigm. 2) Improving the CISIApro simulator with other infrastructures and more detailed information on interdependencies; ongoing work is related to different DSS based on optimization algorithms for different purposes (i.e., natural disaster response, or energy demand/response balance).
